Due Diligence

The Anatomy of a Scam: A closer look at Trouva following its collapse

Now that the penny has dropped following the collapse of the Trouva scam, it’s fitting to do a forensic write-up before all the evidence vanishes into thin air.

The collapse of a scam is never pretty. You see, in real time, the heartbreak, the confusion, and the devastation it causes, and Trouva’s demise is no different.

As panic sets in, with victims scrambling to recover their funds and alert authorities, very few have the presence of mind to document the scam’s operation in detail.

That gap later hinders any chance of recovery or prosecution of the masterminds. Scammers know this too well and move quickly to erase any trace of their scheme.

So, let’s take a closer look at how the Trouva scam (trouva-o2o.com) worked—from its false promises, shady financial tactics, and the technological tricks used to ensnare thousands of South Africans.

The Big, Empty Promise

What was the pitch? In short, it was an investment in consumer products, with the supposed benefit of daily bonuses.

These products ranged from R1,350 to R58,900, with a promised 10% bonus or yield. It sounds ridiculous, but desperation and hope often cloud judgment.

Trouva, the scam, cunningly tried to masquerade as Trouva (trouva.com), the legitimate UK-based online marketplace. By piggybacking on the real company’s good reputation, it sold itself as a legitimate investment opportunity.

In one of the promotional materials, a man—likely a Fiverr voice-over artist—can be seen standing in front of a fake Trouva logo, with the UK and South African flags in the background.

The whole thing looked professional, but it was all a smokescreen. The legitimate Trouva has no presence in South Africa and primarily caters to UK and European customers.

Offline, the scam even extended to church gatherings, where participants pitched Trouva to friends and family, handing out referral links in the hope of increasing their earnings.

Scam: Trouva “Investment” Collapses

How It Worked: A Technical Breakdown

Technically speaking, the Trouva scam wasn’t all that different from other online fraud operations I’ve analysed.

Although I couldn’t retrieve Trouva’s entire site before it was taken down, the technical markers align perfectly with scams like CM-Gold (cm-gold.com) and Annoushka (annoushka-b2c.com).

Here’s a breakdown of how they likely pulled it off, complete with code examples:

1. Fake Engagement to Give the Illusion of Activity

The first step in creating a believable scam is to make the site appear busy. Comments, likes, and other forms of interaction give victims the impression that the platform is legitimate and thriving.

css: url: r.commentText, method: “post”, data: e, headers: {“Content-Type”:”application/x-www-form-urlencoded;charset=utf-8″}

This API call shows how comments were posted, fostering a fake sense of engagement. But don’t be fooled—those comments were likely as fake as the “investment returns.”

sql: baseURL: “https://square.centaminapi.com”, url: r.thumbsUpSquare, method: “post”

This snippet indicates a “thumbs-up” or like feature—another trick to make the platform seem lively, but all just fluff.

2. Basic Account Management

Creating a sense of progression is crucial to any scam. Trouva allowed users to create profiles, complete with avatars, VIP levels, and invite codes, giving them the illusion of advancing within the system.

vbnet: token: Object(r.h)(), avatar: “”, vipLevel: “”, inviteCode: “”, upInviteCode: “”, phone: Object(r.d)(), name: “”, userId: Object(r.i)()

This indicates user profiles being managed with various properties—tokens, avatars, VIP status, and invite codes, all meant to keep victims hooked.

less: a(“SET_TOKEN”,o), a(“SET_AVATAR”,n.headUrl), a(“SET_VIPLEVEL”,n.vipLevel), a(“SET_PHONE”,n.phone)

Once logged in, the system set user-specific data (token, avatar, etc.), enhancing the illusion of personal progress in the investment scheme.

3. The Pyramid Structure Disguised as a Referral System

Referral systems are the bread and butter of pyramid schemes, and Trouva was no different. Users were given invite codes to bring others into the fold, promising rewards for doing so.

vbnet: inviteCode: “”, upInviteCode: “”

This shows that Trouva used a pyramid-style recruitment system, where new participants were encouraged to pull others in, under the guise of “referral bonuses.”

vbnet: shareCode: “”, num: “”, userId: Object(r.i)()

A shareCode suggests further proof of a referral-based recruitment scheme, similar to pyramid operations where victims believe they’ll profit from pulling in new “investors.”

4. Data Collection via Forms

From the beginning, Trouva collected personal data—names, phone numbers, and profile pictures—through form-based input.

css: headers: {“Content-Type”:”application/x-www-form-urlencoded;charset=utf-8″}

This header confirms that user data was sent via URL-encoded forms, allowing the platform to capture personal information such as names and phone numbers.

5. Minimal Backend Interaction

The backend wasn’t designed to handle anything complex—just basic tasks like logins, comments, and profile updates. Payments? No chance. Those were handled manually, likely through external communication with the scammers.

javascript: new Promise((function(e,n){Object(i.a)(o.a.stringify(t)).then((function(t){var i=t.data,n=i.data;if(200==i.code)

This snippet shows a simple login process. It’s a low-interaction backend, not meant to process payments, just enough to keep victims thinking they’re engaged in a legitimate system.

Who Took the Money?

At this stage, it’s unclear who exactly was behind Trouva. There were names floating around—Ada, Milly Jones—but these are likely aliases used to run the WhatsApp groups.

The group admins were linked to a few UK numbers, but upon inspection, they’re most likely VoIP numbers. These include:

  • +44 7301 181689
  • +44 7944 286070
  • +44 7983 279116

The real money? That flowed through South African bank accounts, mainly Capitec. These were probably mule accounts used to funnel money into untraceable places.

Capitec Accounts Used

The following table lists the Capitec accounts allegedly used to receive money from investors:

Account Number Business Name Bank
1052618634 Nice Goods Pty Ltd Capitec
1052610544 New Good Foods Pty Ltd Capitec
1052686826 Trouva Capitec
1052718027 Trouva Capitec
1052629873 Happy Foods Pty Ltd Capitec
1052735878 FGO Tradings Capitec
1275835538 Trouva Nedbank
1052625380 Scented Capitec
1052651992 Avontuur Pty Ltd Capitec
1052710026 Young Boy Pty Ltd Capitec
1540412189 Trouva Absa
1052736297 MM Fashions Capitec
1052653286 Slight Pty Ltd Capitec
1052728740 Sheel Foods Pty Ltd Capitec
1052735894 Teboho Farming Capitec

The Collapse

It all started unraveling with a bogus “identity verification check.” Trouva asked victims to pay between R2,650 and R3,050 to verify their identities. People, desperate to unlock their “earnings,” continued depositing money, despite the obvious red flags.

Of course, no one got their money back. Withdrawals remained perpetually “pending,” and by 4 October 2024, the game was over. The WhatsApp groups were deleted, and Hostinger—the hosting provider—took down the Trouva site.

The Anatomy of a Scam: A closer look at Trouva following its collapse

The Way Forward

Now comes the hard part. Recovering any of the funds will be a long, frustrating process, if it happens at all.

Capitec has already blocked some of the accounts from receiving new deposits, but the money is likely gone, funneled through these mule accounts and then withdrawn into untraceable channels.

You can open a case, but don’t hold your breath. The wheels of justice turn slowly, and the funds may be unrecoverable by the time the media and authorities catch up. As with most scams, the victims will likely be left to bear the loss.

Final Thoughts

The Trouva scam has all the hallmarks of a classic fraud: big promises, fake engagement, and a well-executed pyramid scheme masked as a referral system. The collapse was inevitable, but as always, it’s the victims who pay the price.

If you take anything from this, it should be this: If an investment opportunity sounds too good to good to be true, it probably is. Scammers count on our willingness to believe that quick, easy returns are just around the corner.

But in the end, their promises are as empty as their bank accounts—once they’ve drained yours.


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4 Comments

  1. Shamima says:

    Will i get my funds back from this stupid scammers i was 1 of them people dont fall for this again

  2. Dee says:

    This is so painful that and hurtful, I have lost so much and I’m not even left with debt to pay hope someone the can help us to get our money back

  3. Rachel says:

    I also loss I don’t know where we going to get this evil

  4. Bongi says:

    I’m the other individual who lost a lot the worst part in not working I’ve got no food no electricity if someone can help us just freeze their accounts and reverse our money to our banks please

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